SOMMARIO: 1. La riforma e l’ipotesi di un cambiamento del regime di governo – 1.1. La Costituzione come patto e il quesito referendario – 1.2. Effetti di sistema della nuova legge elettorale – 1.3. Verso un diverso regime di governo? – 1.4. Incoerenza del cambiamento di regime rispetto a qualsiasi modello costituzionale – 2. Riflessi del progetto attuale di riforma costituzionale sulla applicazione del principio di sussidiarietà – 2.1. La mancata attuazione della riforma del 2001 in materia di sussidiarietà – 2.2. La nuova riforma e la sussidiarietà.
The Italian popular referendum about some constitutional changes proposed by the Government finds its profound reason in the very nature of the Constitution as a pact between the people and the Government. The Senate reform in the Government’s constitutional bill, in its implications, should be strictly connected to the recent reform of the electoral system of the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati). The doctrinal work here presented intends to dig deeper and look through the connected effects of two reforms and also examines the effects on the parliamentary regime (characterized by parliamentary control and votes of confidence towards the Government) also in the light of comparative items with other western constitutional systems. Concerning this aspect, therefore, the work’s conclusions suggest that the Italian system is going in direction to exit from parliamentary regime towards another regime as regard with witch, nevertheless, we can’t find any other similar model in Europe. The second part of the article examines the constitutional reform in comparison with the “Vertical Subsidiarity Principle” regarding the distribution of administrative functions. The Author recalls the constitutional reform of local government put forth in 2001. This reform introduced the “subsidiarity principle” into the constitutional context but the Author complains that, in the following years, the reform wasn’t properly applied and moreover it was clearly disregarded. The new reform remarkably reduces the autonomy of local authorities and their legislative and administrative powers and competences. The Author especially focuses on the reform’s effects with regard to smaller districts, and argues that the new Senate as a Chamber of Regions (Camera delle Regioni) hasn’t enough power to oppose to the above mentioned restrictions of powers, and, finally, he states that the “subsidiarity principle” will risk to become a little more than a simple, academic program for the future.